IDF probe reveals 41 Nukhba terrorists infiltrated Sderot on Oct. 7 • Israel suffered 53 fatalities, including 37 civilians
The IDF's Southern Command's Northern Brigade was found largely responsible for the failures in protecting Sderot during Hamas's October 7 Massacre, an IDF probe published on Wednesday found.
The probe found that the IDF has "misguided concepts and failed" and that "there is full responsibility from the Northern Brigade." According to the investigator, "Sderot is within the operational area of the Northern Brigade. On October 7, no force from the brigade arrived."
"The IDF had misguided concepts and failures over the years that placed the operational end in a situation it couldn’t prevent. The responsibility lies with the Northern Brigade, the Gaza Division, and the Operations Division. Misguided concepts for years," he added.
Commander of IDF Southern Command's Northern Brigade, Col. Haim Cohen, submitted his resignation letter from the IDF late in March.
During fighting in Sderot, the largest city near the Gaza border, 41 Hamas terrorists infiltrated the city, 39 were killed, and two were captured. Before being killed, they murdered 53 Israelis, including 37 civilians, 11 police officers, three IDF soldiers, and two firefighters, the probe confirmed.
Nukhba terrorists first infiltrated Sderot at 6:59 a.m., 30 minutes after the infiltration into Israel began. This was followed by a second infiltration at 7:01 a.m. and a third at 7:30 a.m.
IDF forces did not arrive until 8:30 a.m., the probe noted.
IDF forces eventually gained operational control of Sderot at 10:30 a.m. on October 7, and complete control with an end to the fighting at 8:30 a.m. on October 8, the probe added.
The Northern Brigade, particularly troops of the 77th Battalion, were responsible for guarding the entrance points to Sderot, and were armed with two or three tanks.
The probe also found that 10 rockets were launched on Sderot between 6:29 and 7:15 a.m., with 41 rockets in total launched towards the town on October 7.
Approximately 800 soldiers were involved in defending Sderot, with the probe investigator adding that there may have been more than 1,000, including Border Police, Israel Police, and senior IDF commanders. However, the investigator later clarified that this number signifies total mobilization over the period, and there were not this many fighting at the same time.
Communications difficulties
The probe found that forming a situational picture at all levels, local military operations centers, the IDF command, the Northern Brigade, etc., was "very difficult due to collapsed control systems and the impact of Hamas terrorists on communication systems and military bases, such as Re'im."
Further, "the IDF didn’t understand the overall situation in the Gaza border communities." the investigator noted.
The probe noted that the Palestinian infiltration warning successfully sounded and "got everyone out," but that the standby unit in Sderot did not have long-range weapons for fighting due to a lack of weapons storage in the town caused by bureaucratic issues.
A question was asked of the investigator concerning this, and the investigator confirmed that the IDF Operations Directorate ordered that if there is no weapons storage in the town, residents should be "disarmed." This led to the standby security unit going to fight off Nukhba terrorists with their personal handguns.The investigator also informed that "in the two years prior to October 7, there was no training for the standby unit for such scenarios," adding, "The responsibility of the IDF and Northern
Brigade was to ensure that the standby units were prepared. Sderot does not have a preparation file like other settlements, and this is a major issue. The IDF is responsible for readiness."
Lessons and conclusionsThe probe found that the IDF failed in its mission to protect Sderot on October 7. This was in part because the military was "not prepared for a wide surprise raid."They had no depth of defense at a brigade, battalion, or company level, with all defense of the town relying on the security fence.The probe recommended that "Rapid solutions for large-scale raids were necessary and that Sderot must also receive a permanent force to protect it."Another finding was that the communications systems at the time were inadequate, including a scenario where the Northern Brigade did not update the IDF 13th Battalion about one of the infiltrations because "it was not within their sector."There was no unified system coordinating between different organizations and forces, which led to a large number of forces being concentrated in Sderot at the expense of other towns, villages, and kibbutzim, the probe added.
"Sderot's mayor was not aware of the standby unit and its weaknesses. The security officer was the one communicating between the mayor and the Northern Brigade.
He spoke with the brigade commander and the Gaza Division, and there was the district commander who was connected to the battalion. From my conversation with him, the mayor was unaware of the entire security system in his city, which was weak," the investigator clarified.The probe also found that "had a warning been issued to the city when the terrorists first infiltrated the area inside the security fence, it would have been possible to set up blocking forces at key points at the city entrances and thwart enemy attacks."Security arrangements were "insufficient," and the IDF's standing orders did "not align" with Sderot's characteristics.There was also no synchronization between the deployment of IDF and Israel Police forces, including a major gap in communication between the IDF, Home Front Command, Border Police, and Sderot municipality, partly due to a lack of a joint command center, even after the infiltration began.The probe also found that there was no communication between the IDF's Operations Directorate, and the Gaza Division, leading to a lack of Frontal Supervision Points, which would allow combat troops to receive orders and directions in captured territoryThe investigator was asked what lessons have been learned and what changes have been made, and informed that In addition to increasing the strength of the army in the Northern and Southern Brigades, some of the security components have been improved. The readiness and preparedness of the standby units were enhanced. There are now boulders rising from the road to block the entrances at junctions.""In addition to increasing the IDF’s forces in the Northern and Southern Brigades, there is now a security zone that no one is supposed to enter, creating a depth of defense," he added.When questioned if this was changed within Sderot itself, he answered, "Some of the security components have been improved, including the number of forces present, the standby units, and their readiness. There is also a process of setting up various blockages in the city, at the entrances.""Not gates, but various types of bollards. Posts that rise from the road and block the passage. Including cameras added there, larger forces have been deployed, and currently, there is a very large force guarding Sderot," he clarified.
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